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SLAMMING THE CLOSET DOOR SHUT: ABLE, THOMASSON
AND THE REALITY OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
I. INTRODUCTION

During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton sought the gay
vote by promising to remove the military's longstanding ban against
homosexual and lesbian service members.' The ultimate product of his
promise was 10 U.S.C. § 654, the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. 2 Under this policy, incoming service members are not forced to
reveal their sexual orientation,3 and such orientation, by itself, is no
longer considered to be a bar to service.4
The new policy was intended to be a compromise between lifting the
total ban and reducing the incidents of military witch hunts designed to
eliminate the homosexual presence in the military.' Unlike the former
ban, the new policy focuses on homosexual conduct, not homosexual
orientation, as the impetus for discharging a soldier. 6 The policy also
gives an accused service member the opportunity to exonerate him or
herself by rebutting the presumption that he or she is likely to engage in
homosexual conduct. 7

While the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is on its face a
compromise, its practical effect is to continue to reduce the homosexual
presence in the military.' The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy has done
little to reduce either the frequency of these witch hunts or the number of
soldiers removed for violating the policy. 9 Yet, because the "Don't Ask,
1. See Jeanne M. VanderHeide, Is "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Constitutional?
Legislative and Judicial Reform of the Military's Ban on Gay Men and Lesbians, 40
WAYNE L. REv. 1273, 1273 (1994).
2. See Kenneth S. McLaughlin, Jr., Challenging The Constitutionality of President
Clinton's Compromise:A PracticalAlternative to the Military's "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"
Policy, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 179, 179 (1994).

3. See id.
4. See Judge Blocks Ouster of Homosexual Sailor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at

A23.
5. See He Should Have Lifted the Ban,

HARTFORD COURANT, July 20, 1993, at

B12.

6. See Paul Quinn-Judge, Military Policy on Gays Detailed; Conductis Target, Not
One's Orientation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1993, at 3.
7. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(E) (1993).
8. See Lift the Ban, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 7.
9. See id.
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Don't Tell" policy seeks to proscribe conduct, ° and does not remove
soldiers on the basis of their sexual status alone," the policy should
withstand the legal attacks initiated by discharged soldiers who claim the
act is unconstitutional.
Two such attacks have created a circuit split in the federal courts of
New York and Virginia. 2 The two cases, Able v. United States, 3 and
Thomasson v. Peny,1" are in the appeals process and the final resolution
of the issues involved will likely be determined by the United States
Supreme Court. 5 This note will explain why the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy will likely be held constitutional by reviewing the federal
courts' treatment of litigation surrounding the prior policy on homosexuals
in the military, by examining 10 U.S.C. § 654 and its effect, and by
focusing specifically on the Able and Thomasson opinions. Part II
discusses the motivation behind the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Part
III examines the policy itself. Part IV discusses the practical effects the
policy has had since its implementation. Part V analyzes Able v. United
States. Part VI scrutinizes Thomasson v. Perry. Part VII discusses the
future of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and Part VIII concludes by
reiterating why the policy should be upheld.

II. A NEw POLICY IS NECESSARY
Following sixty years of negative treatment toward its gay
members,' 6 the official policy of the military toward homosexual service
members was revised in 1981'7 to command the discharge of all known
homosexuals in the military regardless of the service member's personal
merit." This directive declared that homosexuality was "incompatible
with military service"" and that the presence of homosexuals adversely

10. See Quinn-Judge, supra note 6, at 3.
11. See Judge Blocks Ouster of Homosexual Sailor, supra note 4, at A23.
12. See "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" is Upheld in Va. Case, USA TODAY, June 15,
1995, at 2A.
13. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
14. 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995).
15. See Policy on Gays in Military Goes to Appeals Court This Week, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 11, 1995, at A4 [hereinafter Policy on Gays].
16. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 181-84.

17. See id. at 184.
18. See id.
19. Id.
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affected the morale of the military. 2 Clearly, this ban focused on the
status of a member's sexual orientation, and used that status as the
criterion for discharge.2" While President Clinton's pre-election promise
was one source of inspiration for changing the former policy,' 2
concurrent litigation attacking the ban's constitutionality also threatened
its future and suggested the formulation of an alternative.' Numerous
litigants challenged the old policy claiming, inter alia, that discharging
service members based on their homosexual status violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.24
In one such case, Meinhold v. United States Department of
Defense,' the Navy sought to remove Keith Meinhold, a distinguished
officer who had admitted his gay orientation. 6 Meinhold filed suit
against the Navy, claiming that the military's policy of discharging
members on the basis of sexual orientation violated his Equal Protection
rights under the Fifth Amendment.27 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California agreed.' While the final outcome
of Meinhold's case on appeal did not find the policy unconstitutional, 29
the district court's decision at the time further illustrated the need for a
new policy.3 0
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was announced by President
Clinton on July 19, 1993, following extensive political debate, newspaper
editorials, and United States senatorial hearings on the gay ban.3' Under
the new policy, the military no longer seeks to remove servicemen and
women solely on the basis of their homosexual status.3" On June 1,
1994, a federal district court in Washington, D.C., held that the
20. See id.
21. See Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific,
Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REv. 55, 55 (1991).
22. See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L.
REv. 919, 924 (1994).
23. See id. at 924.
24. See id. at 922.

25. 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
26. See Williams, supra note 22, at 924.
27. See id.
28. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458
(C.D. Cal. 1993).

29. See Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479.
30. See Williams, supra note 22, at 924.
31. See id. at 921-22.
32. See Sense on Gays in the Military, SACRAMENTO

BEE, Apr. 3,

1995, at B6.
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"[government's] regulation mandating separation from service by reason
of homosexual status or on account of statements of homosexual
orientation is unconstitutional. " " The new policy's arrival had been
timely, indeed.
III. THE POLICY, 10 U.S.C. § 6540
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654,
begins by stating fifteen congressional findings that describe the motivation
behind its construction.35 First, Congress reiterated its authority to
regulate the armed forces through the enumerated grant of power in
Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution.3 6 The Act then
declares that there is no basic, constitutional right to serve in the armed
forces.37
Among its findings, Congress determined that the most critical
element in determining military success is unit cohesion or, "the bonds of
trust among individual service members that make the combat
effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat
effectiveness of the individual unit members." 3" Congress found that
military life differs significantly from civilian life because military society
is characterized by restrictions on individual behavior and liberties that
would not be acceptable in civilian society."9
The thirteenth congressional finding of the policy declares that the
prohibition against homosexual conduct continues to be a necessary
component of military life. 4 The fifteenth finding states the policy's
basis, by declaring that the presence of those in the armed forces who
either demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale and unit
cohesion that are the keystones of military capability. 41
33. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 929 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
34. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).

35. See id. § 654(a).
36. See id. § 654(a)(1).
37. See id. § 654(a)(2).
38. Id. § 654(a)(7).
39. See id. § 654(a)(8)(B); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(holding that the military could, to further the interest of military cohesion, prohibit a
soldier from wearing religious headgear without violating the First Amendment).
40. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993).
41. See id. § 654(a)(15).
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In making its findings, Congress elicited extensive testimony from
both current and retired military officers, doctors, and professors of
law.4" On the subject of military personnel policies, General Norman
Schwarzkopf stated that, "[i]n every case-[n]ot most cases-in every case
where homosexuality became known in the unit, it resulted in a
breakdown in morale, cohesion, effectiveness-[w]ith resulting dissent,
resentment, and even violence."' Additionally, Congress was informed
by witnesses that "[t]he ... ability of Government to restrict ... liberties
is linked with the primary purpose of the military establishment to protect
national security. . ..
[W]here the military's need for morale is
threatened, a service member's constitutional rights may be restricted
lawfully by commanders."'
Thus, the congressional determinations
contained in the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy are likely influenced by
these individuals and their testimony concerning, inter alia, the negative
impact that homosexual service members may have on military
cohesion.'a
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy states three instances in which a
service member may be removed from the military for violation of the
policy:'
1. When the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts.47 A positive
determination here will result in separation unless there are further
findings that the member has demonstrated that:
(A)
such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and
customary behavior;
(B)
such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to
recur;
(C)
such conduct was not accomplished by use of force,
coercion, or intimidation;
(D)
under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent
with the interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good
order, and morale; and
42. See 139 CONG. REC. S7603 (1993) (statement of Sen. Coats).

43. Id. at S7604.
44. Id. at S7605.
45. See id.

46. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
47. See id. § 654(b)(1).
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(E)
the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts.S
2. When the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect. 49 Again, the member may produce
evidence to show that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts
to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts.50
3. When the member has married or attempted to marry a person of
the same biological sex."
For the purposes of the Act, homosexual activity is defined as both
"any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between
52
members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires"
and "any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand to
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in the acts described
[above]."53
On its face, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was designed to
accomplish the following goals: to no longer ban individuals merely on the
basis of their status as homosexuals;' to prevent homosexual conduct,
which Congress has determined to be detrimental to the military's
goals;55 and to reduce the incidents of military witch hunts designed to
flush out those thought to be homosexual.5 6 The new policy has sought
to achieve these goals in several ways.
First, under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, new applicants will
not be asked questions designed to reveal their sexual orientation.
Further, even when a service member has been found to have committed
homosexual acts or uttered a statement in violation of section 654(b)(2) of
the policy (a statement that he is a homosexual or words of similar
48. Id. § 654(b)(1)(A)-(E).

49. See id. § 654(b)(2).
50. See id.
51. See id. § 654(b)(3).

52. Id. § 654(f)(3)(A).
53. Id. § 654(f)(3)(B).
54. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
55. See id.
56. See id.; see also Philip Shenon, When 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Means Do Ask
and Do Tell All, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1996, § 4, at 1 (suggesting that contrary to the
policy's intent, witch hunts continue to occur aboard Naval vessels).
57. See Williams, supra note 22, at 925.
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import),58 he still cannot be automatically separated. 9 The policy gives
a service member the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the
presumption that he or she is likely to engage in homosexual acts and that
the particular instance in question was an aberration from his or her usual
conduct.'
The policy specifies neither the quantity nor quality of
evidence that a service member would have to provide in order to
successfully rebut this presumption.6
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is designed so that military
commanders in the armed forces are not permitted to initiate investigations
into an individual's background unless there is credible information that
a basis for discharge or disciplinary action exists.62 For example, an
allegation made by another service member that a soldier is homosexual,
by itself, is not grounds for the commencement of an inquiry. 63 Thus,
on its face, the policy in its design comports with President Clinton's
promise to curtail a status-based ban,' while still maintaining Congress's
continued desire to exclude those whose conduct would deem them unfit
for military service.65
IV. THE POLICY'S PRACTICAL EFFECTS
Through its practical effects, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy has
thus far done little to distinguish itself from the former total ban in its
ability to reduce the homosexual presence in the military.67 Evidence
shows that the number of discharges related to homosexual conduct has
dropped from 949 in 1991 to 597 in 1994.68 However, these numbers
are deceiving because the total number of active military personnel has
also declined, from 1.9 million to 1.5 million, during this time period.69
58. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
59. See id.
60. See Williams, supra note 22, at 925.

61. See Walter John Krygowski, Homosexuality and the Military Mission: The
Failureof the "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy, 20 U.
62. See Williams, supra note 22, at 927.

DAYTON

L. Rv. 875, 922 (1995).

63. See id.
64. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
65. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993).
66. See And the Ban Stays On, S.F.

CHRON., May 10,

1994, at A18.

67. See Orwell and 'Don't Tell,' ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1995, at 18A.
68. See Chris Black, Gays in Military Find Backlash, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5,
1995, at 1.
69. See id.
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Thus, the new policy has had the effect of keeping consistent the number
of individuals removed for their homosexuality at 0.04% of the total
military personnel.7' In fact, in some military branches, the rate of
discharge has even increased: in 1994, the Air Force removed 180 airmen
from service for violating the policy, compared to 111 in 1992." In
1995, the Army, Navy, and Marines discharged a combined total of 488
service members for violating the policy--a seventeen percent increase
from the previous year.'
Second, although the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was designed to
create an environment more accepting of homosexuals,' evidence
suggests a backlash by those who are responsible for enforcing the
policy.74 Enforcement of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy rests
within the discretion of individual commanders.'
Surveys indicate that
military commanders remain staunchly opposed to a homosexual presence
in the military.76 As a result, one of the policy's key prongs, refusing
to ask new applicants about their sexual orientation, often is not
enforced.7 7 Specific examples include one recruit who was asked about
her sexuality more than four times, both orally and on an outdated written
form.78 Further, commanders are allowed and even openly encouraged
to flout the policy by creating open-ended investigations of suspected
personnel.7 9
Commanders have initiated investigations based on weak allegations
without credible support,' seized and examined personal property
including letters, photographs, and diaries, 8 and interrogated parents,
roommates, and friends about individuals' sexual propensities. ' Soldiers
have even been ordered to "out" any fellow soldier and report anyone
70. See Jonathan S. Landay, New Policy on Gays In Military DrawsFire One Year

Later, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1995, at 3.
71. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
72. See A Bad Policy Made Worse, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 15, 1996, at B6.
73. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
74. See Black, supra note 68, at 1.

75. See id.

76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
79. See id.
80. See Black, supra note 68, at 1.
81. See id.

82. See id.
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suspected of being a homosexual; both violations of the policy's intent."
There are few reports of commanders being disciplined for these violations
of the policy, 84 even though the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network
cited 180 instances in 1994 in which commanders from the combined four
branches of the armed forces violated the new policy.' Included in this
report was a classic military witch hunt conducted at a Marine base in
Okinawa, Japan, in which twenty-one Marines were interrogated about
their sexual orientation.' 6 In 1995, the Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network cited 363 cases in which military officials violated the policy by
orientation or by
either questioning service members as to their sexual
s7
harassing soldiers suspected of being homosexuals.
The discretion given to military commanders to enforce the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy has not resulted in completely negative
ramifications for homosexuals."8 Some military commanders have used
their discretion to protect homosexuals.8 9 In certain instances, an
individual will be deemed too valuable to lose and no action will be
taken,' even though the service member admits to violating the
policy. 9' Other instances point to lax enforcement by commanders, even
those openly confronted with homosexual conduct by service members. 2
As of early 1995, fifteen individuals who violated the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy continue to openly serve in the military.93 In most
instances, these individuals have received support from their fellow
soldiers. 4 The same can be said for Keith Meinhold, who had
83. See id.
84. See id.

85. See Eric Schmitt, The New Rules on Gay Soldiers: A Year Later, No Clear
Results, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 13, 1995, at Al.

86. See id.
87. See Dana Priest, Military, Despite Policy Shift, DischargedMore Gays in '95;
Perry PromisesInquiry but Sees No 'Significant Change,' WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1996,
at A2.
88. See Schmitt, supra note 85, at A16.

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Art Pine, Few Benefit From New Military Policy On Gays, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1995, at Al.

93. See Schmitt, supra note 85, at Al.
94. See id. at A16.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

successfully challenged the former ban95 and who was reinstated under
the new policy,96 on the condition that he not repeat his statement of
homosexuality.'
Meinhold has, for the most part, been tolerated and
even embraced by his colleagues. 9"
While Keith Meinhold's situation may have ended positively, the new
policy's detrimental effects on homosexuals seem to outweigh any
potential benefits. The flexibility and discretion allotted to commanders
gives them the ability to pick and choose whom to prosecute and whom
to leave alone. 99 Further, such discretion grants commanders the ability
to plea-bargain with violators, offering them immunity against prosecution
in exchange for their testimony against other service members.'1
The discretionary, arbitrary enforcement of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy has served to perpetuate a tense atmosphere,' 0' wherein
suspected homosexuals are aggressively singled out."~ Particularly
revealing is the statistic that, as of early 1995, only four service members
were able to successfully rebut the presumption that they were likely to
engage in homosexual acts, thus saving their military careers.,0 3
The apparent intent of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was to
make the military more accessible to homosexuals." ° However, in
reality, Congress created a policy that has continued to produce the same
effect of deterring homosexuals from careers in the military. 05 Unlike
the former ban, the new policy focuses on homosexual conduct, rather
than status, as the means by which unwanted members can be removed
from the armed forces."° The next question is whether the new policy
will survive the forthcoming constitutional attacks.

95. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir.
1994).
96. See Lynn Rosellini, One True Gay Life in the Navy: When the "Faggot"Met the
"Bigotfrom Hell" and His Pals, Strange Things Soon Happened, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 60.

97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Pine, supra note 92, at Al.
100. See Williams, supra note 22, at 926.
101. See Pine, supra note 92, at Al.

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Lift the Ban, supra note 8, at 7.
105. See id.

106. See Quinn-Judge, supra note 6, at 3.
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V.

ABLE V. UNITED STATES 10 7

On March 30, 1995, Judge Eugene Nickerson of the Eastern District
of New York held that the section of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
creating a presumption of homosexual conduct based on statements made
by a service member was unconstitutional under both the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution."'s In their complaint, six lesbian and gay members
of the armed forces filed suit in federal court attacking the constitutionality
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on both First Amendment and
Equal Protection grounds, naming the United States and the Secretary of
Defense as defendants. °9
The plaintiffs won the initial battle when the federal district court
granted a preliminary injunction, allowing the six members to remain in
the military during the course of the litigation.' 10 A second victory
came when the court denied the government's motion to vacate the
injunction."' In the next phase of the litigation, the government's
motion to dismiss the complaint was granted in part and denied in
part."12 The relevant portions of that decision held that the plaintiffs had
indeed stated causes of action for violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and for violation of freedom of expression under
the First Amendment." 3 The plaintiffs' claims, that the Act and
Regulations violated their right to intimate association and that the Act and
Regulations were overbroad and vague, were dismissed."4
The government appealed the initial injunction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." 5 In a per curiam opinion, the
court upheld the preliminary injunction but remanded the case to the
district court, whereupon a full trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims
would take place." 6 Yet, before the district court addressed the merits
of the case, it held that, based on the pleadings, the plaintiffs lacked
107. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

108. See id. at 979-80.
109.
110.
111.
May 10,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
See Krygowski, supra note 61, at 914.
See Able v. United States, No. 94-0974, 1994 WI. 792657, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
See Able v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
See id. at 114.
See id. at 115-16.
See Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128 (2nd Cir. 1995).
See id. at 131-32.
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standing to bring three of their claims." 7 Therefore, the only issue
before the trial court was whether section 654(b)(2)" 8 of the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment and
Equal Protection rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment." 9 Section
654(b)(2) of the policy addresses removal of a service member based on
statements made by the member that would create a presumption that he
or she would engage in homosexual acts." Because the plaintiffs in
their complaint stated that they were homosexuals (as opposed to actually
engaging in homosexual acts), the court only examined the validity of that
section.'
Thus, the first question under the court's consideration was
whether the government could, without violating the First Amendment,
prohibit a member of the armed forces from stating that he is a
homosexual. 2
The essence of the plaintiffs' First Amendment argument was that the
policy inhibited their right to free speech because of the inference (of
engaging in future homosexual conduct) that could be made against them
by statements such as, "I am a homosexual.""
In response, the
government asserted that 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) does not violate the First
Amendment because this subsection is directed at acts, not speech, and
also because members who face removal can rebut the presumption that
they will engage in homosexual acts. 24
Similar to the Able plaintiffs, opponents of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy claim that the policy "chills" service members' First
Amendment rights to state their sexual orientation.'11 The policy's
rebuttable presumption arises only with service members whose statements
reveal a homosexual or bisexual orientation. 26 Conversely, a service
member's statement of heterosexual orientation has no consequences. 27
Therefore, it may be argued that the policy seeks to engage in content117.
Mar. 14,
118.
119.

See Able v. United States, No. 94-0974, 1995 WIL 116322, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
1995).
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (1993).
See Krygowski, supra note 61, at 917.

120. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2 (1993).
121. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 972 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
122. See id. at 973.

123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Krygowski, supra note 61, at 927.
126. See Williams, supra note 22, at 929.
127. See id.
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based restriction of homosexual service members' statements.12 Such
restriction would undoubtedly fail under strict scrutiny, 29 and opponents
would argue, 30therefore, that the policy should be found
unconstitutional. 1
In its analysis of the First Amendment issue, the Able court
acknowledged that the speech uttered by the plaintiffs (an admission of
their homosexuality) had significant value and, therefore, fell within a
category of speech protected by the First Amendment.13 1 Thus, the
government could regulate the content of plaintiffs' speech only after
showing that such regulation was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
interest. 32 At this point though, it seems the district court had blurred
the issue.
The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, it can be argued, is not aimed
at regulating "homosexual" speech. The policy merely uses speech as a
way of identifying certain service members whose future conduct could be
detrimental to the military. 133 The court refused to accept this use of
speech as a predictor of future acts, stating that "the government elected
to allow them to join and remain in the Services only on the condition that
they remain silent regarding their status. " "
In attempting to provide a basis for its decision, the court found that
there was no true distinction between the government's definition of
homosexual "orientation" and homosexual "propensity," going so far as
to call the treatment of these terms "Orwellian. "35 The. court declared
that a service member's chances of rebutting the presumption of conduct
The court further stated that the
was at best "hypothetical."36
government is still seeking to remove service members on the basis of
their status as homosexuals, whose presence is not welcome by the
The court
majority of heterosexual members of the military. 137
concluded that, under the First Amendment, removal proceedings cannot
128. See id.
129. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that
content-based governmental restrictions on free speech will be subject to strict scrutiny).
130. See Williams, supra note 22, at 929-30.
131. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
132. See id.
133. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820, 824 (E.D. Va. 1995).
134. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 974.
135. Id. at 975
136. Id.
137. See id. at 979.
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be commenced solely on the basis of statements of homosexual
orientation. 3 8 The court therefore held that section
654(b)(2) of the Act
39
is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 1
In addressing plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, the court made a
determination that the policy has provided heterosexuals, on the basis of
sexual status, the right to exercise free speech while denying that right to
homosexual service members." 4 The court declared that, in order for
the policy to stand, the government had to show that the policy is "tailored
to serve a substantial governmental interest.""'
Without deciding
whether the government's purpose was to prevent homosexual acts from
occurring, or whether it was merely a pretext for the military's possible
heterosexual prejudices, the court declared that the government had not
met its burden. 42 Therefore, the court held that section 654(b)(2) of the
Act is also invalid under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth
Amendment. 43
The court did not provide any other support or
explanation for its holding."4 The government appealed the district
court's ruling. 4 5
The district court's analysis of the action taken by Congress in
creating the new policy is accurate. Yet the reasoning used to strike down
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy as applied to these six plaintiffs is
without support," 4 and the decision should therefore be reversed on
appeal. The court was on-target when it stated that the impetus behind the
new policy was that "[d]efendants recognized that a policy mandating
discharge of homosexuals merely because they have a homosexual
orientation or status could not withstand judicial scrutiny" 47 and that
"[d]efendants therefore designed a policy that purportedly directs
discharge based on 'conduct' . . . ."'s Yet the court stretched logical
reasoning when it stated that an admission or acknowledgment of status is
"transmogrified into an admission of misconduct, and misconduct that the
138. See id. at 976.
139. See id. at 980.

140. See id. at 980.
141. Id. (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).

142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.

145. See "Don'tAsk,Don't Tell"? Don't Count On It, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 3,
1995, at A6.

146. See 141 CONG. REC. S5171 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
147. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 975.
148. Id.
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speaker has the practically insurmountable burden of disproving." 4 9
Without supporting its contention, the court declared that the policy treats
an admission of homosexual orientation as (irrebuttable) proof that the
individual will commit homosexual acts.' 50 Yet at trial, the government
produced evidence of three separate instances wherein members of the
Navy were able to rebut the presumption of their tendency to commit
homosexual acts, after they had stated that they were homosexuals. 5
Such proof was offered in an attempt to show that there was a legitimate
chance of avoiding removal under the new policy. 52 Without explaining
its reasoning, the court dismissed this evidence as "three atypical results
that are obviously aberrations that cannot be taken to show that the Act
holds out any realistic opportunity to rebut the presumption." 153
Further, the court's analysis of the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim
is flawed.' 4 First, the court utilizes, but does not provide any
explanation for applying, an intermediate standard of review. 5 5 The
employment of this standard places a greater burden on the government,
one that was not deemed necessary in five previous federal appeals
"' involving the challenging of a military policy on the basis of
cases 56
sexual orientation. 57 When an Equal Protection claim arises related to
an issue of sexual orientation, the appropriate standard remains rational
review, not intermediate scrutiny." 8 As a class, homosexuals have yet
to be recognized as a discrete, insular minority, marginalized by society
and therefore worthy of heightened scrutiny.159
Second, the court provided no justification for determining that the
The "Don't Ask,
government failed to meet its required showing."
Don't Tell" policy as codified relies not upon random prejudices but upon
149. Id.
150. See id. at 976.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See 141 CONG. REc. S5171 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
155. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 980.
156. See Walmer v. United States Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995);
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Meinhold v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735
F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
157. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995).
158. See id. at 827.

159. See id.
160. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 980.
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Congress's opinion that unit cohesion is put at risk by the presence of
homosexual conduct in the armed forces.' 6 ' Instead of addressing the
policy as it stands, the court relied on the testimony provided by those in
favor of a complete ban, made during the Senate hearings before the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was effectuated.1 62
While the government did discuss possible prejudices against
homosexuals as an alternative argument, the court admitted that within
fifteen findings supporting the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, there is no
mention of heterosexual animosity toward homosexuals. 6 3 Nor is there
discussion of what effect the reactions of heterosexuals towards a
homosexual presence would have on unit cohesion."6 The court's
determination that the policy violates the plaintiffs' right to Equal
Protection is unsubstantiated, without rational support, and has been
criticized on the floor of the United States Senate.' 65 Senator Nunn
stated:
[T]he Able decision was not correctly decided.., particularly in
view of the unusual approach taken by the district judge in which
he, in effect, drafted his own statute, manufactured his own
legislative purposes, and reviewed the policy without regard to
the standards articulated over a long period of years by the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 66
Able v. United States is a poorly written opinion: one that provides
more emotion than logic and supportive precedent. 67 For the reasons
heretofore
discussed, Able v. United States should be reversed on
6
appeal. 8

161. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (1993).
162. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 976.

163. See id.
164. See i.
165. See 141 CONG. REc.

S5171-75 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nunn).

166. Id. at S5173.
167. See id.
168. See Deborah Pines, Military Policy On Gays Debated In Circuit Court,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1996, at 1.
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VI. THOMASSON V. PERRY

69

The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy went into effect on February 28,
1994.17° On March 2, 1994, Naval Lieutenant Paul Thomasson wrote a
letter to his superior officer declaring, "I am gay.""7 Immediately, the
Navy began removal proceedings against the ten year soldier who had a
stellar record" and the support of his commanding officer."
Thomasson's hearing lasted two days before a Naval Board of Inquiry
and included testimony, argument, and the introduction into evidence of
Thomasson's service record and documents concerning the Navy's stance
on homosexuality. 75
The Navy acknowledged both Thomasson's
superior service record 7 6 and the lack of evidence indicating that he had
engaged in any homosexual acts.'7 However, Thomasson refused to
introduce into evidence any rebuttal of the presumption, based on his prior
statement, that he has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts. 78 The
Board of Inquiry thus unanimously determined that Thomasson had not
rebutted the presumption raised by his statements and recommended that
Thomasson be honorably discharged.' 79
A Naval Board of Review unanimously affirmed the Board of
Inquiry's decision to remove Thomasson. 1"
The district court of
Virginia granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Navy from
removing Thomasson pending the resolution of his lawsuit. 8' Thus
began Thomasson v. Peny, 1 a second challenge to the "Don't Ask,
1
Don't Tell" policy that is headed toward a federal court of appeals n
169. 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995).

170. See Schmitt, supra note 85, at A16.
171. See Policy on Gays, supra note 15, at A4.
172. See Kim I. Mills, Clinton's 'Don'tAsk' Policy Faces 2 Telling Court Fights,
CHi. SuN-TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1995, at 38.

173. See id.
174. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 823.

175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.

182. Id.
183. See "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" is Upheld in Va. Case, supra note 12, at 2A.
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and perhaps ultimately to the United States Supreme Court for its final
disposition.84
However, unlike the plaintiffs in Able v. United States,""
Thomasson was removed from the Navy after the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Thomasson's motion for
summary judgment. 18 6 The court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment,1"7 holding that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
is constitutional and does not violate Thomasson's First Amendment or
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantees. 8"
Thomasson brought an action before the district court, seeking
permanent injunctive relief to prevent the government from removing him
on the basis of his statement.' 89 Thomasson challenged the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act."9
Thomasson first argued that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
infringes upon his First Amendment rights because the policy suppresses
certain statements, such as a declaration of homosexuality, by making
those statements in and of themselves grounds for dismissal. ' 9 The
court, however, pointed out that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does
not mandate removal on the basis of statements.19 Rather, "the policy
uses the speech as evidence, via rebuttable presumption, that the service
member's declaration of his homosexuality will lead to homosexual
conduct."' 93 The court discussed how evidence of speech to prove
motive or intent has been held not to violate the First Amendment in a
criminal context." 9 The same can be said for a civil context, wherein
the litigant has even fewer constitutional protections as compared to a
184. See Judge: Rights Not Violated By Military Policy On Gays, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 15, 1995, at A12.
185. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
186. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 831.
187. See id.

188. See id.
189. See id. at 821.
190. See id.

191. See id. at 824.
192. See id.
193. Id.

194. See id.; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (holding that
the evidentiary use of speech to prove intent or motive is consistent with the First
Amendment).
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criminal defendant. 95
Further, if Thomasson's speech were to be
considered an admission, such an admission could be used as evidence of
facts admitted. 91 6
Thomasson further argued that the policy penalized an individual's
truthful statements about his own identity and his affiliation with particular
groups. 97 The court dismissed this aspect of Thomasson's argument by
citing precedents holding that "a service member's expressive rights must
often yield to the necessities of military life."' 98 Here, the court's
reasoning parallels several of the congressional findings made in the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that indicate that military life is different
because individuals may be restricted in ways that would be unacceptable
in civilian life.'
The court dismissed Thomasson's First Amendment
claim by recognizing that the policy seeks to remove service members
based on their engaging in proscribed homosexual conduct, not solely on
the basis of their speech.' ° For these reasons, the court held that the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does not violate Thomasson's rights under
the First Amendment."
Unlike the threadbare discussion of the plaintiffs' First Amendment
claim in Able,'0 2 the Thomasson court provides an organized and
detailed analysis as to why the policy is constitutional under the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause." 3 Thomasson had argued an
Equal Protection violation on three grounds: the policy discriminated
against homosexuals on the basis of their status as homosexuals; it
discriminated against acknowledged or "open" homosexuals on the basis
of their status; and it irrationally presumed that "open" homosexuals will
violate military codes of conduct.'
The court began its discussion by first determining that the proper
standard of review is rational review,2 ' unlike the standard of
195. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 824.

196. See id.; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990).

197. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 825.
198. Id.
199. See sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
200. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 825.

201. See id. at 825, 831.
202. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
203. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 826-27.

204. See id. at 826.
205. See id. at 826-27.
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intermediate scrutiny utilized in Able. 6 In support of its determination,
the district court pointed to prior Equal Protection challenges made by
homosexuals against the former policy. 2°7 In eaph instance, five federal
courts of appeal held that rational review was the proper standard, whether
the basis of the challenge was homosexual conduct or statements. 203 The
court refused to grant Thomasson's request for heightened scrutiny, citing
the Supreme Court's "great 'reluctan[ce]' to expand the number of
classifications afforded heightened scrutiny."'
In evaluating the policy under rational review, the court sought to
determine whether the policy was rationally related toward achieving a
legitimate governmental purpose.2 10 Further burdening Thomasson's
chances of success on his Equal Protection claim was the precedent that,
in any proceeding challenging the validity of a military action, courts must
always accord great deference to the judgment of political branches.21'
Specifically, the Supreme Court has noted the lack of competence courts
maintain212in questioning decisions made by Congress in a military
context.
The district court held that in creating the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy, the government had a legitimate purpose in regulating the military,
and that the policy, as created, rationally furthered that end.213 First,
the court recognized that the constitutional powers given to Congress to
regulate the military and "make all laws necessary and proper to that
end" 214 are broad and sweeping.2 15 Second, the court gave2 16credence
to several congressional findings explicitly stated in the policy.
Among the findings respected by the court are that unit cohesion
remains "the single most important factor in maintaining an effective
militia."2 7 The court accepted the government's argument that allowing
individuals who are likely to commit homosexual acts to remain in the
military would, by their presence, introduce sexual tension into the units,
206. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 980.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 826.
See id.
Id. at 827; see Cleburne v. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 827.
See id. at 827-28.
See id.; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 830.
Id. at 827; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 827.
See id. at 828-29.
Id. at 828.
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which would in turn undermine unit cohesion and jeopardize military
preparedness. 1 8 The court supported this statement by declaring that,
"[t]he military is entitled to deference for its professional determination
that these legitimate concerns would adversely impact our nation's military

readiness. "219
The district court also found the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy's
rebuttable presumption to be a rational means of prohibiting individuals
who are likely to engage in homosexual conduct from serving in the
military. 2 The court cited precedent for the proposition that using
statements as a means to indicate a propensity to engage in sexual conduct
is a rational and reliable indicator of an individual's direction and
drive."
The court concluded its analysis by restating its refusal to
second guess the rationale or motivations of the government.' 2 Rather,
the court noted that it must simply determine whether the government's
purpose in creating the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was
legitimate.'
If so, the court needed to determine whether the means
stated by the policy were rationally related to achieving the policy's
ends. 4 Because the court determined that the government had made
that showing,' the court held that the policy did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's Equal Protection clause.'
The court then turned its attention to Thomasson's remaining
claims.' 2 Thomasson stated that the policy violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by: "(1) creating and applying a legal
classification that is unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) applying a
presumption that is in fact irrebuttable; and (3) imposing an irrebuttable
presumption grounded on a class-based expectation."'
Thomasson
argued that the statute was overbroad insofar as it provided for removal
218. See id. at 828-29.
219. Id. at 829.
220. See id. at 830.
221. See id. at 829-30; Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
222. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 830.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing congressional record
that supports the findings contained within the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and
therefore supports the Thomasson court's determination that the policy passes rational
review).
226. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 831.
227. See id. at 830.
228. See id.
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of those who may be homosexual, but who may not actively engage in the
prohibited conduct. 9
In dismissing Thomasson's first argument, the court held that the
statute dictates removal for those members who have raised, but cannot
rebut, the presumption of their intended conduct." ° The fact that there
may be individuals who declare a homosexual orientation, but in fact
intend on remaining celibate, was not at issue?3 '
Both types of
individuals are placed under the same burden of rebutting the presumption
or facing removal, and through this same treatment, the policy cannot be
deemed overbroad. 2
The court dismissed Thomasson's second argument by pointing to
empirical data showing that three members have in fact been able to rebut
the presumption after making statements regarding their
homosexuality. 3
Therefore the policy is not irrebuttable. 4
Thomasson's third Due Process argument focused on the constitutionality
of creating an irrebuttable presumption based on a class-based expectation,
when the issue of violating the policy calls for an individual
assessment. 235 The court dismissed this argument by pointing to the
policy's procedure of allowing the service member the opportunity to
rebut the presumption and, as was the case with Thomasson, to have a full
hearing on the merits of his charged violation. 6 Finally, on the basis
that the policy provides for, and the fact that the Navy had given
Thomasson a full trial on the merits of his case, the court held that his
removal by the Navy was neither arbitrary nor unsupported by substantial
evidence and, therefore, not in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 7 Therefore, because the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does not
violate Thomasson's rights under the First Amendment," the Equal
Protection 9 or Due Process2' Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, or the
229. See id. at 831.

230. See id.
231. See id.

232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.

236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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Administrative Procedure Act,24' the court granted the government's
cross-motion for summary judgment.242
The Thomasson decision is clearly at odds with Judge Nickerson's
opinion in Able v. United States.243 In upholding the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy, Judge Claude M. Hilton used a systematic approach in
analyzing and dismissing Thomasson's numerous claims. The opinion is
written concisely and is supported throughout by precedent established by
both federal courts of appeals as well as the Supreme Court. 2' In this
respect, Thomasson differs from the Able opinion written by Judge
Nickerson, whose rhetoric has lead that opinion to be referred to as a
"question-begging pronouncement disguised as jurisprudence"2 45 whose
passages "sound more like an editorial from the New Republic than a
sober judgment by a real jurist. "2
Thomasson appealed his decision and his case was heard before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, en banc, on
December 5, 1995.247 On April 5, 1996, in a 9-4 decision, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed Judge Hilton's decision, 2' thus delivering supporters
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy a major victory. 249 In refusing
to accede to Thomasson's arguments that the policy is
unconstitutional,"
the court emphasized its reluctance to overturn
congressional laws governing military life stating:
Congress has enacted and the President has signed legislation
providing that a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
is incompatible with the distinctive requirements of military
service. This considered judgment on the part of the coordinate
241. See id.

242. See id.
243. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see Military Policy on Gays, PITT. PosTGAZETTE, June 15, 1995, at A13.
244. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 820.
245. Samuel Francis, The Politics of Immorality, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1995, at
A21.
246. Id.
247. See Randolph Goode, Gay Policy Prompts Court Quiz; Judges Not Expected
To Rule Till Early 1996, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 1995, at B1.
248. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).

249. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Rethink Ruling on Gay Ban, Appeals Panel Tells
Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at A8.
250. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 919.
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branches of our government is one that the third branch has a
solemn duty to respect. 251
In doing so, the court continued a tradition of judicial 52
deference toward
congressional laws aimed at regulating military policy.
Able v. United States 3 had also been appealed,' and the threejudge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
heard the government's appeal on January 16, 1996.1 On July 1,
1996, the Second Circuit vacated Judge Nickerson's decision and
remanded the case back to the district court 5 6 At the district court
level, Judge Nickerson had denied the plaintiffs standing to challenge
section 654(b)(1)--the section of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that
proscribes homosexual conduct 57 Therefore, the trial court only
examined the constitutionality of section 654(b)(2)--the section of the
policy addressing removal of a service member based on statements made
by the member that would create a presumption that he would engage in
homosexual acts. 8 On appeal, the court held that Judge Nickerson had
erred in granting the plaintiffs' standing to challenge only one section of
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy stating:
[t]he subsections rise or fall together: if Congress is permitted to
require that service members be discharged if they engage in
homosexual acts, then both subsections are constitutional, but if
the Constitution prohibits such a requirement, then the statements
presumption of [section 654](b)(2) must fall as well. 9
Thus, the court vacated Judge Nickerson's decision and remanded the
matter back to the district court, whereupon the merits of both sections of
the policy could be adjudicated.'W
251. Id. at 923.
252. See Neil A. Lewis, Court Upholds Clinton Policy On Gay Troops, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1996, at Al.
253. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
254. See Policy on Gays in Military Goes to Appeals Court This Week, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 11, 1995, at A4.

255.
256.
257.
Mar. 14,
258.
259.
260.

See Pines, supra note 168, at 1.
See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
See Able v. United States, No. 94-0974, 1995 WL 116322, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
1995); see also supra pp. 319-20.
See id.
Able, 88 F.3d at 1292.
See id. at 1300.
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Although the Second Circuit neither affirmed nor reversed the district
court, the court is considered to be more liberal than the Fourth
Circuit2 6' and, therefore, more likely to declare the policy
unconstitutional.' z However, the language employed in the court's
opinion suggests that, had it decided the merits of the case, it may have
reached an unexpected outcome.
In examining section 654(b)(2) of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy,
the court acknowledged that governmental restrictions on individuals'
liberties, which would be abhorrent in civilian society, can be permissible
in a military context. 263 Further, in addition to stating that the
government had an important interest in preventing homosexual
conduct, 264 the court found the government's use of speech to create a
rebuttable presumption of future homosexual conduct to be sensible: 6 5
"This evidentiary use substantially furthers the government's interest
because it is plain to us that there is a correlation between those who state
they are homosexual and those who engage in homosexual acts."2' The
court thus declared, "if the acts prohibition of [section 654](b)(1) is
constitutional (the issue to be decided on remand), we believe that the
statements presumption of [section 654](b)(2) does not violate the First
Amendment. "267
Therefore, Congress has thus far succeeded in creating a policy that,
in effect, continues the former ban against homosexuals while at the same
time passes at least one of the constitutional attacks promulgated against
it. 6 However, on July 1, 1996, Paul Thomasson petitioned the Supreme
Court of the United States to review his case, 269 thus making Thomasson
v. Peny270 the first challenge to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy to
reach the nations's highest court. 271

261. See Van Natta, supra note 249, at A8.

262. See id.
263. See Able, 88 F.3d at 1293.

264. See id. at 1296.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 1296-97.
267. Id. at 1296.
268. See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995).
269. See Deb Price, DischargedOfficer Takes Heartin Recent Court Decisions as
He Challenges Gay Ban, DET. NEWS, July 5, 1996, at D9.
270. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).

271. See 'Don't Ask' Ruling Sent Back, NAT'L L.J., July 15, 1996, at A8.
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VII. THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"

While the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy's practical effects make it
indistinguishable from the former ban,2' the policy is likely to be
upheld by future courts for several reasons. First, courts are not quick to
overrule Congress's discretion and judgment when regulating the
military. 2' Second, the policy does not automatically ban those who
have admitted their homosexuality. 4 The policy permits those who
have made an admission of homosexual orientation to nonetheless prove
that they will not engage in homosexual acts, although the nature and
quantity of evidence required to rebut the presumption has yet to be firmly
established.275 While Judge Nickerson may deride the success rate, 76
the fact remains that as of January 16, 1996, seven individual service
members have rebutted the presumption and have thus remained in the
military. 2'
Further, Congress has the right to proscribe behavior deemed
detrimental to military success. 278 In proscribing homosexual conduct
in the military, Congress has made an arguably rational conclusion that
those who identify themselves as homosexuals through statements do so
because they either have engaged in homosexual activity or may have the
inclination to do so in the future. 9 Therefore, from the government's
and the Thomasson280 court's point of view, the rebuttable presumption
is a valid instrument in focusing attention upon those individuals who are
likely to violate the policy by engaging in homosexual conduct.28
By granting a soldier the opportunity to avoid removal by rebutting
the presumption and by characterizing the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
as a proscription on conduct, as opposed to mere status, Congress has
created a policy that will likely survive the First Amendment and
2 Equal
Protection attacks that the former ban would not have withstood.
272. See Mills, supra note 172, at 38.
273. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
274. See Bruce Fein, Judge TurnedAdvocate, WAsH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al 8.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See Pines, supra note 168, at 1.
278. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57; United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
279. See Fein, supra note 274, at A18.
280. Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995).
281. See Fein, supra note 274, at A18.
282. See, e.g., Cammermeyerv. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 926 (U.S.D.C. 1994).
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The First Amendment attacks should fall because the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy is not about censoring service members' right to free
speech, but merely uses their speech as an indicator of future conduct. '
The First Amendment's protective net, which allows citizens to say
essentially what they please, is not cast as widely in the military.'
For
example, in civilian society, a female may utter a seemingly harmless term
of affection to a male, and her statement will likely be protected as free
speech.'
The same statement uttered in a military context could result
in disciplinary action for sexual harassment.) 6 To create the most
effective military, the government must be free to regulate its armed
forces without overbearing judicial restraints.'
In terms of an Equal Protection argument, homosexuals have never
been recognized as a class warranting any greater protection than that of
rational review. 8 Further, the courts have traditionally given greater
latitude to the government to create rules for the military. 9 For these
reasons, an Equal Protection attack should also fall.
When comparing the two district court opinions, Thomasson provided
strong, precedentially supported explanations for the lack of an Equal
Protection violation, while Judge Nickerson in Able29 did not apply the
correct standard of review29 and was, in essence, criticized by the
Second Circuit for his procedural handling of the case.'
In the
meantime, the Thomasson opinion has apparently been holding greater
precedential weight than its conflicting brother, Able. 93 In a recent
decision, a district court upheld the Navy's removal of Lieutenant Richard
Selling for violating the military's policy against homosexual conduct.' 4
In doing so, the judge held that the military's 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
283. See Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 824.
284. See Dubious Decision On 'Don't Ask,' CHI. TIB., Apr. 2, 1995, at 2.
285. See id.
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288. SeeBruceB. Auster, Next: A FederalCourtroom, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REP.,
July 5, 1993, at 47.

289. See id.
290. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
291. See id. at 980.
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"Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1996, at 1.
293. See Michael James, Judge'sRuling Allows Navy to DischargeGay Md. Officer:
No Violation is Found ofHis Freedom of Speech, BALTIMORE SuN, Nov. 2, 1995, at 3A.
294. See id.
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policy "is designed to prevent homosexual acts and any incidental burden
on speech resulting from its application does not violate the First
Amendment. "295
VIII. CONCLUSION
In enacting the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, Congress has
essentially continued the former ban's effect of minimizing, though not
296
totally eliminating, the homosexual presence in the military.
However, by focusing on homosexual conduct and not homosexual status,
Congress has created a policy that will likely continue to withstand
constitutional attacks. 2'
Eventually, the final outcome of the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy will be decided by the Supreme Court.298 On
its face, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy presents itself as a
compromise between the former ban and an encompassing embrace of
homosexuality. 2' Therefore, the Supreme Court may decide to uphold
3
the policy for the very reason that it presents itself as a compromise. 00
While the policy does not allow homosexuals to "openly" serve, the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy still grants them greater freedom to serve
in the military than they have ever before enjoyed.
Scott W. Wachs
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